

1. Executive Summary

[We] will also work to expand our use of civilian volunteers from outside our government, who have the right skills and are willing to serve in these missions.

—(President George W. Bush, May 18, 2005)

None of us should forever be using military forces to do what civilians should be doing.

—(Condoleezza Rice, August 2001)

1.1 Background and Purpose

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was formed within the Department of State by Congress in response to the changed realities of a post-9/11 world. Given the many threats to national security in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, the U.S. Government (USG) must address more than the traditional humanitarian and developmental goals. The military and diplomatic models of the last century are no longer valid. Afghanistan in 2001 was a radical demonstration of why the stabilization of war torn societies is critical to global security. The stabilization and/or reconstruction of failed and failing states has become one of the defining challenges of our era.

This transformation from conflict to stability creates a critical need to build USG capacity in a broad range of skills necessary in Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) operations. A recommended solution is a Civilian Reserve (CR), made up of private and public sector industry experts, who are committed to working toward the stabilization and reconstruction of the weak, disintegrating, and collapsed states that have become sources of regional disorder, transnational terror, and humanitarian calamity.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice introduced this idea in her speech on Transformational Diplomacy on January 18, 2006, "Should a state fail in the future, we want the men and the women of this office to be able to spring into action quickly. We will look to them to partner immediately with our military, with other federal agencies and with our international allies, and eventually we envision this office assembling and deploying the kinds of civilians who are essential in post-conflict operations: police officers and judges and electricians and engineers, bankers and economists and legal experts and election monitors."

Since its establishment, S/CRS conceived of a suite of response mechanisms to fill the need described by Secretary Rice in 2001. The mechanisms are: the Active Response Corps (ARC), the Standby Response Corps (SRC), the Civilian Reserve, and the Global Skills Network (GSN). The ARC serves as S/CRS' first responders, trained and ready to deploy within 1–14 days. They are full-time USG employees who are responsible for the assessment and execution of urgent operations.

When required, the ARC is supplemented by the Standby Response Corps. SRC members, made up of USG employees from civilian agencies, volunteer to be available for deployment within 30 days' notice for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The SRC mission lasts approximately 180–365 days.


The Civilian Reserve is made up of a new kind of USG employee—one that is treated uniquely

from a human capital management perspective, and is benched until called up for deployment training and mobilization. Recruited from Federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector, they form a reserve pool of highly-qualified functional experts and program managers. They succeed ARC and SRC members in the field to sustain and expand deployment operations for approximately one year.

Contractors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations form the “Global Skills Network”, a set of vetted and experienced international professionals sourced through various funding mechanisms and supervised by USG employees, who serve as the fourth response mechanism. They supplement the Civilian Reserve and allow USG civilians to draw down after an embassy is established, or if the host government is independently capable of managing operations.

The timeline for these deployments can be found in figure 1-1. In practice, however, some personnel of the ARC/SRC, CR, and GSN would likely be present simultaneously rather than sequentially, with the mix evolving as circumstances require and with each group concentrating efforts in their areas of comparative advantage.

Figure 1-1. Timeline of Civilian Response Mechanisms



Given the history of applying U.S. Government civil service staff and contractor staff overseas to post-conflict environments, the ARC, SRC, and GSN response mechanisms are conceptually more mature than the Civilian Reserve. There exist case studies for these three organizations from which to draw lessons learned, as well as examples of individual, agency, and corporate experiences. The Civilian Reserve, on the other hand, has no prior history. The challenges surrounding the creation of a Civilian Reserve are manifold.

1.2 Management Study Approach

On March 3, 2006, S/CRS contracted with BearingPoint to conduct a detailed study on the requirements for establishing and managing a Civilian Reserve. The scope of work posed substantial and fundamental questions:

Who should the Civilian Reserve recruit?

- Functional skills
- Professional experience
- Personal qualifications

What strategies and incentives should be employed to attract the right people?

What practices should be employed to select and retain qualified people?

What is the optimal deployment length and frequency?

What team and management structures should be employed in the field?

What types of training should Civilian Reservists receive?

What types of equipment and other support should be provided to facilitate Reservists' and mission success?

Where should the Civilian Reserve be located within the USG, and how should its Headquarters be structured?

What administrative and management functions should CR Headquarters staff provide, and what is an appropriate mix of permanent USG staff and contractors?

How much will the Civilian Reserve cost –

- to create and sustain the roster?
- to deploy Reservists?

What new legislation is required to make the Civilian Reserve successful?

To best respond to research requirements, BearingPoint organized its Management Study Team into five sub-teams that correspond to the S/CRS focus areas: Human Resource Planning, Deployment Operations, Administrative Planning, Budget Planning, and Legal and Regulatory Support.

The BearingPoint team benchmarked more than 135 relevant organizations from the USG, the international community, NGOs and the private sector. BearingPoint deployed a customized survey instrument to over 2,000 potential reservists, conducted numerous focus groups, and attended several conferences. In addition, BearingPoint researched more than 500 legal and legislative references and constructed cost models and budget projections. The compilation of

research contained in this Study also includes prior studies by the U.S. Government, academic institutions, private sector actors, international organizations, and think tank circles.

1.3 Recommended Civilian Reserve Model

Historically, USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts have either failed or achieved less-than-desirable results. Part of this failure is due to an inelastic situation-based approach to R&S. As R&S experts have observed, each scenario, whether in Kosovo, Sudan, Afghanistan, or Iraq, is unique and requires an R&S model that can be tailored to fit particular mission needs. BearingPoint has created a Civilian Reserve model that is built from the ground-up based on functional requirements research; it is responsive to variable planning factors in scale and flexibility, adaptive to any mission or scenario, and designed to withstand the frequently changing variables of these fast-moving and ever-changing situations.

Specific recommendations surrounding the BearingPoint Team's Civilian Reserve model are highlighted by sub-team below:

1.4 Human Resources Planning

The CR should be built and maintained with a broad mix of skill sets and roles consistent with the full range of R&S tasks and program support requirements to ensure that the Reserve maintains maximum flexibility for deployment into different operations. Functional areas include establishing/reestablishing rule of law; providing essential (non-humanitarian) services, and repairing/rebuilding infrastructure; establishing/reestablishing operability of government institutions; preparing local leaders to operate in a democratic market system; and initiating a political transition process. Table 4-3 of the Human Resources Planning section contains specific recommended positions and levels, followed by a suggested roster allocation over the initial three-year CR build-up. The roster composition may change over time as conditions (e.g., types of post-conflict scenarios anticipated, evolution of other USG agency capabilities, and other factors that affect demand for the CR) dictate alterations in the necessary mix of skills, roles, and numbers.

To aid in recruiting candidates to fill these positions, S/CRS should build a "CR brand", marketed and attached to DoS from the outset of the CR creation process. This will support a more focused recruiting strategy that applies a mix of universal and targeted approaches to help attract potential candidates from targeted sectors (analysis of specific resource pools is provided in Table 4-5 of the Human Resources Planning section). Specific recruiting efforts should make use of the most cost-effective media strategies for the identified target markets—web advertisements, professional and academic forums, association outreach, and university partnerships—supported by a centralized on-line information and application center that can also be used for candidate tracking by CR Headquarters.

To facilitate acquisition of skilled, capable resources, CR Headquarters should take a three-pronged approach to evaluating applicants based on a set of knowledge, skills, and attributes (KSAs) that are core to the CR program as a whole, as well as job-specific knowledge and experience. This would start with a standard application submitted on-line to enable efficient screening for basic requirements, followed by a written examination to filter applicants on responses to key factors. The evaluation process should culminate with an in-person Assessment Center program that relies upon multiple evaluation methods to assess each candidate's ability to perform the required job tasks in post-conflict environments, and to effectively represent USG

and its interests while doing so.

New hires should be salaried using pay bands as a salary scale, relying on market standards and current individual pay rates for starting offers with flexibility to adjust as needed, and applying differentials as a standard add-on to base compensation. This should be supplemented by a standardized cafeteria-style benefits program reflecting participant requirements and a mix of incentives flexibly applied to respond to changing needs and conditions.

All new hires should enter into a standard service agreement with a four-year term, clearly laying out Reservist and USG responsibilities. The service agreement should note that the ability for Reservists to refuse deployment call-ups is limited to select pre-defined situations backed by enforceable sanctions. The CR service agreement should be supported by Reservist re-employment rights so that individuals are able to return to their jobs post-deployment. To establish these rights, the CR should create a specific program that combines legislative mechanisms with initiatives to proactively facilitate employer support. In certain cases, particularly law enforcement, subsidization of local employers to actively encourage the growth of dedicated, trained, and readily available resources may also be needed.

When personnel are deployed, CR Headquarters should establish clear performance expectations that are tied to program strategic and tactical goals in a formal, frequent evaluation program. Results should be used to reward and remediate in the field and at individual development and retention decision points after deployment.

Performance management mechanisms should also be used to support retention efforts, to help ensure that those who are permitted to renew their contracts are quality performers. Retention incentives should be selectively applied based on skill requirements and past individual performance, supported by a “pay for performance” scheme that ties compensation increases to results. Care should be taken to ensure effective operations in the field and a positive experience for Reservists throughout the program life cycle so as to maintain the integrity of the institution in the eyes of other potential reservists.

The Constabulary Police should be a part of the Civilian Reserve response mechanism, but for a variety of reasons, they should be recruited, trained, and organized separately.

1.5 Deployment Operations

Based on findings from benchmarking interviews and focus groups, a maximum 12-month tour length during a four-year commitment is acceptable to prospective Civilian Reservists and would satisfy both operational requirements and continuity concerns. The tour length would include the time needed for onboarding or off-boarding (mobilization and de-mobilization) activities, including pre-deployment training, processing, clearances, travel time, and post-mission debriefs.

S/CRS should adopt and adapt the Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) to organize Reservist teams’ preparation for, and response to, any incident. Once informed that their deployment is imminent, the pre-deployment phase would begin. This phase would average ten days and would include onboarding activities such as vaccinations and medical screenings. Training during this phase would focus on mission-specific briefings and components of the Department of State DSAC course. There would be a 30- to 90-day time period spanning notice of activation to personnel arriving in country.

In terms of organizational structure, the CR should adopt the self-sufficient, modular NIMS ICS structure for its Constabulary Police, with a unit size of approximately 125 officers, and a unit leader-to-officer ratio (or span of control) ranging from 1:5 to 1:10, determined by the risk level in-country. Further, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Constabulary Police should be permanent USG employees, if possible.

To thoroughly understand Civilian Reserve training requirements, a detailed training/needs assessment should be conducted. This assessment should evaluate learning objectives based on organizational strategies, mission, vision, outlook, and direction with focus on desirable knowledge, skills, abilities, and behaviors. Training priorities should be derived from this assessment, as well as optimal training schedules and delivery methods.

Based on information collected from benchmarked organizations, surveys, and focus groups, BearingPoint recommends that Reservists should participate in four to six training events during their period of service: baseline training, orientation, annual training, pre-deployment readiness, leadership training and in-country training. Additional training may be required depending on the objective of the mission and/or the region supported. The Baseline Training curriculum for Civilian Reservists should be developed using off-the-shelf courses available through the DoS Foreign Service Institute (FSI), FasTrac, and by developing contracts to access courses from relevant organizations such as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), USAID and FEMA. Some basic S/CRS instructor-led courses should also be modified to be delivered via a distance learning mechanism.

Orientation training should be conducted over eight business days for functional specialists and ten business days for Civilian Police, Constabulary Police, and related positions. The curriculum should focus on providing Reservists with a strong understanding of the Reserve Program, Reconstruction and Stabilization concepts, security, and application of skills in-country. The program should draw from existing course material developed by the Foreign Service Institute and the Diplomatic Anti-Terrorism Course (DSAC). BearingPoint also recommends that two existing classes from S/CRS' training strategy— "Conflict, Post-Conflict", "S/CRS Overview (R&S Overview-Basic)", and "Interagency, IO and NGO Cultures and Communications"— should also be incorporated into the program.

Annual training should be conducted over six to eight business days, and should focus on some of the same themes delivered during Orientation but should also provide the Reservist with some training on the equipment they would use when deployed as well as standard operating procedures. Some of this training could be delivered via distance learning mechanisms.

Civilian Reserve training should leverage existing/available training facilities, course offerings, and learning management systems and tools that are relevant to the training requirements of the Civilian Reserve. For example, the Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC) should be leveraged for additional training and specific tactical exercises. Annual training should be contracted to a local training provider or academic institution.

Most equipment should be issued during the pre-deployment phase. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) should be established with the Department of Defense (DoD) to leverage equipment, warehousing facilities and maintenance operations. For clothing and textiles, office equipment, electronics, and vehicles, BearingPoint recommends that DoS utilizes Federal Prison Industries, Inc., "UNICOR", to manage and procure the bulk of their equipment.

Accountability practices that include inspection, tracking, de-commissioning, and cost accounting

should follow standard guidelines of the DoS or those of the issuing authority. Non-expendable equipment should be bar-coded with serial numbers for accountability purposes. To identify possible safety hazards and/or equipment in need of repair, non-expendable equipment should be inspected and maintained according to a schedule established by the equipment vendor/provider.

Personnel Security Details (PSDs) are currently provided for a host of personnel serving in post-conflict environments. The number of PSDs required will be determined based on the threat environment and the number of Reservists who will require secure movements daily. It is expected that the same privileges and protections (including PSD ratios) provided to the first responders will be offered to Civilian Reservists while deployed.

Since Reservists will be traveling at the request of the DoS, it is recommended that the Civilian Reserve leverage the existing DoS contract (currently with Carlson Wagonlit) for travel services both domestically and internationally, or obtain a separate vendor to coordinate travel arrangements. To manage deployment on the ground, an office should be established similar to the Model for Overseas Management Services (MOMS), which managed the in-processing for 3161, DoS, TDY and inter-agency personnel deploying to Iraq. MOMS handles DoS requirements such as country clearances, travel orders, travel vouchers, and deployment assistance.

BearingPoint recommends that ARC members be charged with the responsibility of determining housing needs and assessing housing pool options. If an Embassy compound or another response organization has adequate housing space available, this should be the first consideration. If no housing exists, BearingPoint recommends that DoS utilizes pre-negotiated Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs) to address housing requirements.

1.6 Administrative Planning

The Civilian Reserve's mission and operational requirements suggest that it should reside within S/CRS, with the Director of the Civilian Reserve reporting to the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. This will maximize the Coordinator's ability to manage the Civilian Reserve as one of multiple response mechanisms and will provide the Civilian Reserve consistent oversight and adequate technical guidance. S/CRS will need to modify its organizational structure in order to facilitate the success of the Civilian Reserve by adding an operational emphasis and a Board of Advisors that would provide balanced, objective guidance to S/CRS in establishing and managing its response mechanisms.

Within the Civilian Reserve itself, the need to remain agile, flexible, and scalable calls for a lean headquarters staff that centralizes administrative authority and leverages existing DoS infrastructure and capabilities. A management structure should be introduced that consolidates administrative and oversight functions into a Civilian Reserve Program Management Office (PMO). This PMO should be divided into three key areas: Reserve Administration, Reserve Management, and Reserve Operations. This structure should also include leadership by a Director and Chief of Staff; technical experts to provide oversight, guidance, and coordination; and close coordination with the DoS Bureau of Administration's Human Resources Division (A/EX/HRD) as well as other appropriate offices for personnel administration requirements.

The Civilian Reserve Headquarters should perform the following administrative and overhead functions: policy and outreach; program analysis and evaluation; resource management; strategic staffing; marketing and recruiting; personnel administration; training; requirements management;

logistics; and communications & technology. Specific recommendations for USG oversight and contractor support in each area are provided in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. Recommendations for USG Oversight and Contractor Support

Function	Detail
Policy and Outreach	USG employees should make policy decisions and represent the Civilian Reserve externally, but they should employ contractor staff to provide analytical support and recommendations.
Program Analysis and Evaluation	While certain performance measurement requirements and decisions should be the responsibility of DoS staff, contractors should perform the majority of program analysis and evaluation.
Resource Management	Because of the inherently governmental nature of managing the budget and acquisitions, these functions should be primarily USG responsibility, with contractor support for analysis and to augment staff in times of surge.
Strategic Staffing	Strategic staffing should be carried out jointly by DoS staff and contractor support.
Marketing and Recruiting	The majority of marketing and recruiting should be contracted to qualified firms, primarily because recruiting needs will fluctuate significantly as the Civilian Reserve is built, sustained, and deployed.
Personnel Administration	To the extent practicable, the Civilian Reserve should leverage existing DoS capabilities through the Bureau of Administration's Human Resources Division (A/EX/HRD) for the majority of personnel administration functions.
Training	The administration and management of the Reservists' training should be performed by contract staff, under the direction and oversight of a USG chief training officer.
Requirements	Requirements management should be carried out jointly by

Management	DoS staff and contractor support.
Logistics	The majority of logistics functions, such as equipment, property accountability, and deployment support can be administered and managed by a contracting entity; however, there are certain functions that will require USG oversight by DoS.
Communications and Technology	Communications and technology support at headquarters and in the field should be administered by contractors; however, official, organizational communications during a deployment should be controlled by DoS staff.

To build and sustain the Reserve will require a total Headquarters staff of 46 in FY2007, 53 in FY2008, 63 in FY2009, and 36 for sustainment after FY2009. In order to support eventual deployments, Civilian Reserve Headquarters will need an additional eight staff members to support a small deployment year (about 600 deployed), 13 to support a medium deployment year (900 deployed), and 24 to support a large deployment year (1,200 deployed).

In addition, the Reserve should fund supplemental staff in other DoS offices to support selected personnel administration requirements. These requirements include additional staff and/or contractors in the Bureau of Administration's Human Resources Division, the Family Liaison Office, Office of Medical Services, and Bureau of Diplomatic Security. To build and sustain the Reserve, these offices will need a total additional staff of 9 in FY2007, 14 in FY2008, and 18 in FY2009 and beyond. In addition to this, they will need 7 more individuals to support a small deployment year, 11 to support a medium deployment year, and 15 to support a large deployment year.

In order to reach the appropriate mix of USG staff and contractors in the Civilian Reserve Headquarters, the USG staff should build-up gradually over the first three years to a sustainment level of 30 people, and contractor support should be used to supplement the USG staff. This will result in a percentage of contractor staff that is large at the beginning (75 percent in FY2007) but decreases as more USG staff is hired (60 percent contractors in FY2008 and 50 percent or less in FY2009 and beyond). Regarding the contracting strategy for headquarters support, the Civilian Reserve should establish a single contracting program with a strategic partner during the formative period of its growth with the option to move to multiple awards once the organization develops and matures.

1.7 Budget

As part of preliminary work to investigate the efficacy of establishing a Civilian Reserve, S/CRS requested \$25 million in funding for the Reserve in FY2007. The \$25 million requested for funding the Civilian Reserve in FY2007, however, is not sufficient to meet the recommendations encompassed in the Human Resources, Administration, and Deployment Operations sections of this Management Study.

The Civilian Reserve requires two funding mechanisms: 1) funding to support the program's creation, sustainment, and management, and 2) funding to support deployments. The current recommended "Create, Sustain, and Manage" budget consists of \$71 million in FY2007, \$101

million in FY2008 and \$169 million in FY2009. Thus, BearingPoint recommends an immediate application from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense requesting the transfer of funds as authorized by Section 1207 of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act. Should funding be limited to initial budget requests, the Civilian Reserve should continue to make the recruitment and creation of police forces a priority.

Once funding is awarded, the Government should take adequate steps to ensure that funds dedicated to the Program's creation are protected from being used to fund deployments of the Civilian Reserve. The Civilian Reserve itself should invest a significant level of effort to plan for possible contingencies in advance to ensure that forecasted Deployment budget requirements are in line with operational expectations.

1.8 Legislative Requirements

In order for the Civilian Reserve to become a reality, legislative issues must be addressed. Proposed legislation to-date with respect to S/CRS and the civilian post-conflict response has not included all the requirements for a successful Civilian Reserve. In addition, previous legislative attempts have not specifically addressed personnel authority for the Civilian Reservist. Findings indicate that an existing federal employment classification with enough flexibility and protection necessary to build, sustain, and deploy a Civilian Reserve does not exist. A comprehensive legislative package should specifically address the personnel authority issue. Therefore, BearingPoint recommends the creation of a new Title 22 employee classification in the Foreign Service which would meet Reservist needs. New legislation should be included in an authorization bill, which would eliminate any uncertainty as to the permanence of S/CRS.

A comprehensive package of new legislation should include the following components:

- Grant exception from Title 5 competitive hiring requirements
- Authority to utilize flexible compensation schemes
- Ability to activate/mobilize, pay, and offer benefits intermittently throughout a defined term of commitment
- Authority to hire federal retirees by waiving dual compensation limitations
- Discretion to grant the greater of benefits typically offered to members of the Foreign Service or Civil Service when overseas
- Guaranteed USERRA-like reemployment rights for non-military personnel (USG Civilian Reservists from the private sector), similar to the precedent set by the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)

1.9 Concluding Remarks

In addition to recommendations regarding the establishment and management of the Civilian Reserve, BearingPoint has also included a set of main foundational observations. While not directly part of the Management Study scope, these foundational observations—S/CRS Organizational Realignment, Comparative Advantage of USG Civilian Reservists, and Implementation of Study Recommendations—represent BearingPoint's perspective on issues that

are key to the successful implementation and long-term success of the core Management Study recommendations.

Although political or budgetary decisions may result in the selective implementation of this Civilian Reserve design, BearingPoint's recommendations are intended to be utilized in different forms and combinations. It is BearingPoint's hope that this study does not end as a study; but rather, that the research, analysis, and recommendations be used as a ready-made blueprint for establishing and managing a Civilian Reserve. BearingPoint looks forward to the action that S/CRS will take, after review of this study, to begin implementing the foundation for a Civilian Reserve.

The transformation of failing states into stable members of the international system is an urgent task that requires careful planning and solid execution. This study is intended as the first step in moving the Civilian Reserve from concept to reality and toward meeting a need that could not be more pressing.

